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A fundamental debate in social sciences concerns how individual
judgments and choices, resulting from psychological mechanisms,
are manifested in collective economic behavior. Economists em-
phasize the capacity of markets to aggregate information distrib-
uted among traders into rational equilibrium prices. However,
psychologists have identiﬁed pervasive and systematic biases in
individual judgment that they generally assume will affect collec-
tive behavior. In particular, recent studies have found that judged
likelihoods of possible events vary systematically with the way the
entire event space is partitioned, with probabilities of each of N
partitioned events biased toward 1/N. Thus, combining events into
a common partition lowers perceived probability, and unpacking
events into separate partitions increases their perceived probability.
We look for evidence of such bias in various prediction markets, in
which prices can be interpreted as probabilities of upcoming events.
In two highly controlled experimental studies, we ﬁnd clear evidence
of partition dependence in a 2-h laboratory experiment and a ﬁeld
experiment on National Basketball Association (NBA) and Federation
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA World Cup) sports
events spanning several weeks. We also ﬁnd evidence consistent
with partition dependence in nonexperimental ﬁeld data from pre-
diction markets for economic derivatives (guessing the values of
important macroeconomic statistics) and horse races. Results in any
one of the studies might be explained by a specialized alternative
theory, but no alternative theories can explain the results of all four
studies. We conclude that psychological biases in individual judg-
ment can affect market prices, and understanding those effects
requires combining a variety of methods from psychology and
economics.
behavioral economics | judgment bias
Different social sciences emphasize fundamentally differentviews of individual behavior and, consequently, of market
misbehavior. When markets produce bad outcomes, as in the
recent economic crises, psychologists are inclined to emphasize
the roles of individual cognitive mistakes such as optimism, and
emotional forces such as greed and fear. Economists are inclined
to emphasize that political pressures and poorly designed eco-
nomic institutions created incentives for rational actors to make
decisions that had negative external effects for society. A scien-
tiﬁc way to make progress in evaluating these viewpoints is to
investigate whether the psychological view could be correct: i.e.,
Can systematic, psychologically plausible mistakes in individual
judgment shift economic market outcomes away from statisti-
cally normative standards?
How individual judgment bias affects aggregate economic
and political activity is likely to depend on details of underlying
psychology and relevant economic and political institutions. For
example, it is well known that there can be a “wisdom of crowds,”
in which group predictions are better than those of most indi-
viduals in the group (1) through averaging of idiosyncratic errors
(2). In particular, if the distribution of judgments is symmetri-
cally distributed around the true value, then the average judg-
ment is expected to be close to the true value. However, if
judgments of group members are biased in a particular direction,
then the group judgment will remain biased (and could even be
more strongly biased than individual judgments).
However, aggregate judgments reﬂected by market prices are
likely to be special compared with other kinds of group aggre-
gation. An economic market price is a “group judgment” in which
each trader’s opinions are weighted by their trading activity;
conﬁdence has to be backed by money. As a result, even if most
investors make a judgment mistake, if a small number of well-
informed and well-capitalized traders do not make that mistake,
then the disproportionate inﬂuence of the “smart money” could
lead to sensible pricing and ideal capital allocation for the
entire market.
This optimistic conclusion about markets is sensitive to as-
sumptions about rationality and trading structures (3). Eco-
nomic theory shows that whether behavioral biases become
smaller or larger due to trading activity depends on whether
more rational traders have an incentive to trade against those
biases to exploit arbitrage opportunities, or trade with those
biases to proﬁt (as in some price bubbles), possibly multiplying
the effect of a small bias (4–7). For example, ﬁnancial money
managers with large sums to invest may be evaluated by clients
who are sensitive to short-term returns. The clients’ “short
horizons” can then limit savvy managers’ willingness to bet
aggressively that market mispricing will be rapidly corrected
(8, 9), which delays corrections or even magniﬁes them.
Given these considerations, the simplest test for psychological
inﬂuences on market activity requires two ingredients: (i) a well-
established, robust psychological pattern of bias in individual
judgment; and (ii) a type of market in which that pattern would
clearly be revealed by observable economic market data such as
prices (e.g., 10). Our studies have both of these ingredients. We
explore whether a speciﬁc judgment bias affects prices in a lab-
oratory experiment and a ﬁeld experiment, and in two natural
prediction markets.
This self-contained series of studies is unique because it shows
the effect of one mathematically speciﬁed judgment bias across
very different levels of judgments and market prices. Previous
studies have extrapolated from interpretations of particular ex-
perimental data to inspire similar analyses of stock market data
(11, 12). However, those studies have not directly linked a set of
experimental and ﬁeld data closely around a single phenomenon.
The psychological pattern we explore is how dividing the set of
possible events into a particular “partition” inﬂuences the per-
ceived likelihood of those events. For instance, when evaluating the
possible closing values of the Dow Jones Index on December 31,
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one might evaluate the events {<12,000; 12,000–13,000; >
13,000} or {<13,000; 13,000–14,000; >14,000}. The tendency
for the speciﬁc partition of the state space to inﬂuence judged
probabilities is known as partition dependence (PD).
The markets we explore are prediction markets in which prices
reﬂect an aggregate judgment of the likelihood of a set of pos-
sible naturally occurring events. In prediction markets, ﬁnancial
claims are traded that pay a ﬁxed sum of money when a precisely
deﬁned event occurs. For example, on September 23, 2012, a $10
claim on the event “Barack Obama to be reelected President in
2012” traded for $7.08. This price implies a collective judgment,
6 wk before the election, that Obama’s reelection has a 71%
chance of occurring. Prediction markets provide an ideal domain
for a test of psychological bias in market prices because asset
values depend only on judged likelihoods of events. Biases in
likelihood judgments could therefore be clearly reﬂected by
prediction market prices.
Our market data therefore create an empirical competition
between the psychological and economic points of view about
whether PD in individual likelihood judgments is also evident
in market prices. Roughly speaking, psychology says “yes” and
economics says “no.”
Early prediction markets were based on remarkable laboratory
experimental evidence that modest amounts of informed trading
could lead to prices that “aggregate” information that is dispersed
among people (13). Inspired by these stylized laboratory examples,
the Iowa Experimental Markets on political events were created in
1992 (14), followed a decade later by other markets on worldwide
current events (e.g., Intrade) and internal markets used by com-
panies for forecasting company outcomes (15, 16).
Prices in prediction markets are usually interpreted as a
collective probability assessment, or “crowd wisdom” of event
likelihood (adjusted for any association between risk taking and
judgment that biases the market price away from the mean; SI
Appendix, section S2). These predictions are found to be gen-
erally at least as accurate, and often more accurate, than those
derived from opinion polls or expert judgments (17–19). Pre-
diction markets provide an ideal test of PD because their events
are often continuously distributed variables that, for practical
reasons, partition the state space into a mutually exclusive and
exhaustive set of discrete events (intervals). Previous studies of
these markets—and economic theorizing about prediction mar-
kets as well—have assumed that the particular way in which the
state space is partitioned should not affect prices. However, if
individual judgmental biases inﬂuence markets, then how parti-
tions are explicitly presented could inﬂuence market prices
through these individual judgments.
Many studies of individual judgment show that “unpacking”
a single interval [I1 ∪ I2] into two separate ordered subintervals
I1 and I2, which are logically equivalent, reliably increases judged
probability [i.e., the sum of the judged probabilities P(I1) +
P(I2) > P(I1 ∪ I2)]. Unpacking an interval into its explicit parts
seems to draw extra attention to those parts and increase their
judged likelihood.
Dependence of judgment on the salient partition of the state
space seems to reﬂect an anchoring of judged probability on a
diffuse “ignorance prior” belief at 1/N (when there are N ex-
plicitly presented intervals), with insufﬁcient adjustment from
the 1/N anchor, due to limited imagination about how different the
intervals are. For instance, in the Dow Jones example above, the
interval X <= 13,000 is two of three events in the ﬁrst partition
(ignorance prior = 2/3) and one of three events in the second
partition (ignorance prior = 1/3). This simple 1/N hypothesis
turns out to be a useful tool for making predictions about when
judgment and price errors will be small or large.
Previous evidence of PD has been found in judgments by
highly trained decision analysts (20), in valuation of hypothetical
insurance policies that unpack possible causes of death (21), and
is robust to learning (22) and ﬁnancial motivation (20, 23, 24) in
laboratory experiments. PD is also evident in economic ﬁeld data
on allocations of savings to personal investments (10, 25), and
allocations of capital to businesses in multidivision ﬁrms (26, 27).
There is also limited previous evidence of PD in prediction
markets (18).
We investigate both whether a PD bias exists in individual
judgments about naturally occurring events, and, if so, whether
prediction market prices propagate that bias or suppress it. The
combination of laboratory experiments, ﬁeld experiments, and
naturally occurring market data that we report also addresses
questions in economics about whether psychological laboratory
effects generalize to important economic ﬁeld settings (28–30).
We present four laboratory and ﬁeld studies using different
events, subject populations, and market mechanisms. If a common
explanation emerges for results in all of the four, then Occam’s
razor should elevate that common explanation over a set of ad hoc
idiosyncratic study-speciﬁc explanations.
Study 1: A Short Laboratory Experiment
Subjects (n = 192) traded bets linked to the eventual numerical
value of ﬁnancial, sports, and weather events (in balanced order
across groups). The full numerical range for each event value was
divided into four intervals. For each of two separate trading
groups, either the two lowest-valued intervals or the two highest-
valued intervals were combined into a single interval (Fig. 1A,
lower part). That is, assets linked to two separate intervals I1 and
I2 were traded by one group, whereas the single interval equal to
their union, I1 ∪ I2, was traded by another group.
Both groups were told about their own partition of intervals
and, crucially, they were also told about the other group’s par-
tition. This instruction to both groups is essential because (in
theory) PD could result from an inference by traders that the
market designer chose partitions that tend toward equal proba-
bility; such an inference would coincide with the 1/N heuristic. In
our design, however, both groups are told about both partitions.
Thus, any inferences that participants draw from the choice of
the partitions should be the same in both groups so that any
difference in the groups’ behavior cannot readily be attributed to
information conveyed by the choice of partitions.
Because winning bets paid 100 cents, holding one asset for
every interval was sure to yield 100 cents when the event’s nu-
merical value is determined. To encourage exploitation of pric-
ing mistakes, subjects were allowed at any time to invest 100
cents to buy a portfolio of one share on each event from the
experimenter. Thus, if the sum of offered share prices was above
100 cents, low-risk arbitrage was possible. Similarly, arbitrage
could be exploited if a set of shares on each event could be
bought for less than 100 cents. Such arbitrage was also common;
small differences occurred in 85% of markets and were arbi-
traged in an average of 12.83 s (SI Appendix, section S1.7).
Trading was conducted in two 10-min rounds for each event,
using a customized continuous double auction (CDA). The CDA
allows subjects to submit either bids to buy or asks to sell, or to
accept current bids and asks to make a trade. Hundreds of ex-
periments have shown that this trading mechanism reveals in-
formation reliably and rapidly (31) and creates near-maximum
gains from trade (32). Subjects also expressed their individual
beliefs about event probabilities before and after trading, so we
could compare market prices with the distribution of those
beliefs and see if market trading changed beliefs from before to
after (Fig. 1A).
Average prediction market prices exhibited a large and per-
sistent degree of PD (Fig. 1B). For instance, the average of the
last three trade prices was 0.354 for Muenster temperature [20–
23.9 °C] and 0.496 for Muenster temperature [≥24 °C] for the
ﬁrst group. However, that average was only 0.707 for Muenster
temperature [≥20 °C] for the second group (SI Appendix, section
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S1.1). The difference of 0.143 (=0.354 + 0.496 − 0.707) is a
measure of PD.
Overall, the difference between the average of the last three
prices of unpacked assets and the associated packed asset was
0.267, 0.229, and 0.149 for ﬁnance, sports, and weather events,
respectively. The corresponding differences in individual pre-
trading judgments were 0.312, 0.261, and 0.278. Posttrading
judgment differences were lower than the pretrading differences
by 0.055, 0.005, and 0.052. The PD gap in prices is also shrinking
slightly across the length of the trading periods (Fig. 1B). These
small effects suggest that market trading can modestly reduce
PD in prices and postmarket judgments.
Study 2: A Multiweek Field Experiment
We found that the PD effect does shrink a little over the course
of the 20-min trading span in the laboratory experiments of study 1.
This observation motivates a second study of a prediction market
involving sporting events that unfold over about 8 wk (n = 456
participants). The events are American National Basketball
Association (NBA) basketball playoffs (2005–2006) and the 2006
soccer World Cup. These prediction markets trade assets over
ﬁve intervals of total victories by NBA teams, or total goals
scored by national teams across the World Cup (in regulation
play, excluding shoot-outs). As in study 1, there were two sepa-
rate trading groups in which assets linked to goal counts of four
teams were traded. In each group, one interval was unpacked into
two subinterval assets and another interval (unpacked in their
counterpart group) was packed into a single asset. The trading
mechanism and all other methods were very similar to those in
study 1 (SI Appendix), but they were adapted for Web access only
and trading was possible for several weeks.
The PD effects are similar in magnitude to those in the lab-
oratory markets. Individual belief judgments summed across
unpacked intervals are a median of 0.20 higher in NBA and
0.15 higher in World Cup markets than in comparable packed
intervals. There is not much visible convergence over time
(Fig. 2A gives results for the most actively traded NBA team,
the Dallas Mavericks).
Creating an index of the amount of overall PD in these prices
is complicated by the fact that liquidity was low. Because there
was not always a range of bids and asks at which to trade, what
“the price” is at any moment in time is ambiguous. A conser-
vative approach interpolates hypothetical prices by assuming that
buyers could always buy at the higher of the last price or the next
purchase price (and oppositely for sellers). This approach creates
a continuous ﬂow of virtual prices, to measure how much could
be hypothetically earned by selling assets on two unpacked events
and buying the cheaper packed event (called PD arbitrage) or
executing the opposite trade (reverse PD; which should never be
proﬁtable if PD exists). The time-weighted average hypothetical
Fig. 1. Design and evidence of PD in a laboratory experimental prediction market. (A) Time course of a typical experimental session in study 1 (upper part)
and construction of assets for the two DAX Index (German stock market) partitions (lower part). The digital option will pay a ﬁxed amount (1V) only if the
DAX closes within the speciﬁed interval 2 wk in the future. (B) The development over time of price differences of the packed and summed unpacked assets,
for the sports assets in study 1. Prices are averaged over all 12 market replications. The difference in the ﬁnal prices is signiﬁcant (Kruskal–Wallis, P < 0.001).
The slope of the time trend for the difference in prices is −0.0094 (Upper) and −0.0159 (Lower).



































arbitrage proﬁt is highly variable among teams, but is much
higher in exploiting PD effects than exploiting reverse-PD effects
(Fig. 2B and SI Appendix, section S2.6). A less conservative mea-
sure using bids and asks, when prices are absent, yields an even
stronger conclusion (SI Appendix, section S2.7).
Study 3: Macroeconomic Indicators
Our third dataset is 153 large-scale “economic derivatives” pre-
diction markets for four macroeconomic indicators, created by
Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank (33). The markets are par-
imutuel in structure and were conducted 1–2 d before the indi-
cators were released. We focus on only “digital options,” which
pay off if the indicator value lies in a speciﬁc interval. A full set
of digital option market prices for N numerical intervals span-
ning the entire range reveals an approximate probability distri-
bution for that indicator’s likely value (Fig. 3, Center).
Suppose the observed market prices are equal to the weighted
average of a hidden “best guess” (unanchored) price and a 1/N
anchor value (Fig. 3). Then a simple statistical procedure can be
used to impute the weight on the 1/N anchor that is implicit in
observed prices (for details, see SI Appendix). The weights are
not precisely estimated—e.g., there is no apparent 1/N effect for
jobless claims—but for the other three indicators, the 1/N anchor
weight appears to be positive (P < 0.10), and it is strongly pos-
itive overall (=0.44, P < 0.01). These results are consistent with
a PD bias in the predicted direction. These results suggest that,
although the Goldman Sachs–Deutsche Bank markets provided
adequate predictions of the underlying macroeconomic indicators,
the predictions were distorted by a bias toward equal probabilities
for all traded events.
Study 4: Horse Races
The fourth and ﬁnal dataset uses horse races. In parimutuel
horse racing, bettors buy tickets on horses they think will win.
The losers’ bets are divided among the winners (after a track
takeout). These are prediction markets because the percentage
of money bet on each horse is a collective perceived (subjective)
probability of that horse winning. Because “long-shot” horses
Fig. 2. Prices and pseudoarbitrage proﬁt opportunities in NBA and World Cup ﬁeld experimental markets. (A) Price chart for packed and unpacked assets in
prediction market trading the number of wins by the Dallas Mavericks, DAL. Numbers at the top of the graph indicate cumulated number of wins. (B) For each
NBA playoff team, average levels of partition dependence (PD) arbitrage are positive and typically larger than reverse PD arbitrage (which is often zero).
(Reverse) PD arbitrage occurs if a hypothetical proﬁt could be made by buying (selling) the packed event in one market and selling (buying) the unpacked
events in the other market. At times where no bids or asks were available, the more conservative from the previous and subsequent price are used, i.e., the
price that makes the occurrence of (reverse) PD arbitrage less likely. Levels are set to 0 if no arbitrage opportunity existed. The numbers displayed in the ﬁgure
are the time-weighted averages of the available PD (or reverse PD) arbitrage levels over the complete trading period for each team generated by the low
intervals (I1 and I2) and by the high intervals (I3 and I4).
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have a low perceived probability, a lot of money is paid out to the
relatively few people who bet in the rare event that the long-shot
wins (i.e., the rate of return, or “odds,” are high).
Many studies show that these long shots are overbet relative
to their actual chances of winning (and favorites with high
probability and low odds are relatively underbet). This tendency
is called the “favorite–long-shot bias” and is well established
across many countries and decades (34). Several different ex-
planations have been offered, including frictions that prevent
equilibration (35), interaction of information and timing (36, 37),
a desire for positive skewness bets, and overweighting of the low
probabilities of long shots winning (34).
The 1/N PD bias is consistent with the favorite–long-shot bias,
because the odds of horses with true probabilities below 1/N (the
long shots) will be overestimated if their odds are biased in the
direction of a 1/N anchor. However, the 1/N bias also makes
the stronger prediction that long shots will be more overbet
(relative to actual winning probability) when the number of
horses (N) in a race is smaller. No current theory of favorite–
long-shot bias makes this prediction (SI Appendix, section S4).
Detecting the effect of the number of horses requires com-
paring perceived market probabilities (from actual market bet-
ting odds) to actual winning frequencies in different probability
categories, and then comparing those perceived–actual differ-
ences across races with different numbers of horses. This has
been done with a remarkable sample of all US horse race starts
from 1992 to 2001 [6.3 million horse starts (34)]. This analysis
shows an orderly pattern in which perceived probabilities of
long shots are indeed higher in races with fewer horses, as
predicted by the PD effect (Fig. 4). Perceived probability
inferred from betting is consistent with placing a weight of 0.12
on a 1/N PD component (much lower than the weight of around
0.40 inferred in study 3).
Discussion
A central question that cuts across social sciences is how individual
cognition inﬂuences collective activity. We focus on whether
judged probability of a numerical interval is partition dependent,
increasing when the interval is unpacked into equivalent adjacent
subintervals. Two experiments and two ﬁeld datasets measure
how much PD is reﬂected in prediction market prices. All four
types of data show substantial and persistent PD in market prices.
PD is evident in a short (1-h) laboratory experiment, in a weeks-
long ﬁeld experiment on NBA and World Cup (Federation Inter-
nationale de Football Association, FIFA) outcomes, in a par-
imutuel prediction market forecasting economic indicators, and
in a population of US parimutuel horse race markets. The studies
span a wide range of structure, time, and trading domains; they
are not meant to comprise a step-by-step “bridge” between lab-
oratory and ﬁeld (as was seminally done in ref. 38).
Combining these data sources is useful for the following rea-
sons: General explanations based on trading frictions (35, 37)
might apply to parimutuel markets but do not apply to the CDA
laboratory and ﬁeld markets; explanations based on information
conveyed by the choice of partitions in horse race and economic
indicator markets are eliminated by laboratory experiments; and
explanations based on low ﬁnancial stakes and trader experience
are eliminated by the parimutuel ﬁeld markets. Occam’s razor
therefore favors the only interpretation that applies to all four
datasets, which is that PD in individual judgments also inﬂuences
market prices (cf. refs. 39–41).
Our studies also illustrate the complementarity between lab-
oratory and ﬁeld methods—an idea that is widely endorsed in
experimental economics (29, 42). In this setting, complemen-
tarity means that the weakness of one method makes the com-
pensating strength of a different method especially valuable.
Studies 1–2 are strong for eliminating perceived information
Fig. 3. Graphical illustration of a mixture model of prediction market prices. The mixture model assumes that the probability distribution observed in the
prediction market (Center) is a linear mixture of a 1/N naïve prior distribution with weight λ (Left) and an unbiased distribution reﬂecting traders’ best guesses
with weight 1-λ (Right).
Fig. 4. The relation between perceived probability (estimated from ag-
gregate market betting) and actual probability (sample relative frequencies)
for races with different numbers of horses. 1/N bias predicts the curve from
races with fewer horses will lie above the curve from races with more horses.
The graph was created from a lowess-smoothed version (bandwidth = 0.4) of
their (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010) Fig. 1 for races with exactly 6, 8, 10, or 12
horses, and then converting racetrack odds to implied probabilities. (Sample
sizes are multiples 0.044, 0.192, 0.145, and 0.053 of the full sample; the
minimum is ∼250,000 horse starts.) Regressing perceived probabilities, for
different numbers of horses and actual probabilities of 0.02, gives a weight
on 1/N of 0.12. Analysis performed by Snowberg and Wolfers, based on data
in their 2010 paper. (Reproduced with permission from Snowberg and
Wolfers.)



































from partitions, but cannot answer questions about PD in natural
settings. Studies 3–4 are strong for naturalism but weak on control
of partition information.
A boundary argument—that markets always work to com-
pletely eliminate judgment errors (28)—is clearly not consistent
with all of our data. In addition, although prediction markets
do have a good track record of predicting naturally occurring
events, compared with other types of prediction such as polit-
ical polls, there is evidence of modest favorite–long-shot biases
even in prediction markets (besides studies 3–4 in this paper),
which is consistent with PD (18). Nonetheless, it is certainly
useful to ask whether there is broader signiﬁcance beyond
prediction markets, for the impact of judgment biases in other
types of economic markets.
Note that PD is just one simple example of “framing,” i.e., how
descriptions can direct attention, exaggerating some features of
asset value and suppressing others. The prediction markets we
used are the simplest markets in which these effects can be shown.
More generally, in asset and credit markets there are many ways
to describe or package statistical features of possible asset values.
These include categorical bond ratings (AAA), coarse categories
(43) (bull and bear markets, National Bureau of Economic
Research-classiﬁed recessions, glamour and value stocks), and
emphasis of summary statistics such as 1-y or 5-y historical returns,
a stock price’s peak in the last year, or a value-at-risk quantile.
Deviations from Black–Scholes pricing of derivative options are
also consistent with subjective weighting of the chance of exercise
(44) (consistent with possible inﬂuence of an {exercise, no exer-
cise} partition). Like explicit partitions, all these types of coarse
descriptions compress information. The psychology behind PD
suggests such information-compressing descriptions might natu-
rally inhibit attention to the information that is hidden by com-
pression, but that is normatively important.
More research is needed to see how generally shifts of at-
tention based on descriptions affect market outcomes. They are
likely to have the least effect in markets dominated by highly
sophisticated traders who can ignore distracting descriptions
and envision underlying value distributions. However, when
there is high uncertainty about value, or when sophisticated
traders care about value perceived by others who are less so-
phisticated (as in many asset markets), it is possible that framing
effects could shift attention in a way that is not dampened
throughout a ﬁnancial system, or is in fact multiplied. More
studies like ours are needed to gain a deeper understanding of
such effects, and their impact and robustness, before prescribing
effective remedies.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. This research was supported by the Deutsche For-
schungsgemeinschaft Grant LA1316/3-1, National Science Foundation (NSF)
Grant SES-00-99209 (to C.R.F.), and The Betty and Gordon Moore Founda-
tion, NSF–Human and Social Dynamics, and Human Frontier Science Program
grants (to C.F.C.).
1. Surowiecki J (2004) The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter than the Few
and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economy, Societies, and Nations (Dou-
bleday, New York).
2. Larrick RP, Soll JB (2006) Intuitions about combining opinions: misappreciation of the
averaging principle. Manage Sci 52:111–127.
3. Russell T, Thaler R (1985) The relevance of quasi rationality in competitive markets.
Am Econ Rev 75:1071–1082.
4. Haltiwanger J, Waldman M (1985) Rational expectations and the limits of rationality:
An analysis of heterogeneity. Am Econ Rev 75:326–340.
5. Haltiwanger J, Waldman M (1989) Limited rationality and strategic complements: The
implications for macroeconomics. Q J Econ 104:463–483.
6. Fehr E, Tyran J-R (2005) Individual irrationality and aggregate outcomes. J Econ
Perspect 19:43–66.
7. Camerer CF, Fehr E (2006) When does “economic man” dominate social behavior?
Science 311(5757):47–52.
8. Shleifer A, Vishny RW (1997) The limits of arbitrage. J Finance 52:35–55.
9. Akerlof GA, Shiller RJ (2009) Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the
Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism (Princeton Univ Press, Princeton).
10. Camerer CF (1987) Do biases in probability judgment matter in markets? Experi-
mental evidence. Am Econ Rev 77:981–997.
11. Benartzi S, Thaler RH (2001) Naive diversiﬁcation strategies in deﬁned contribution
saving plans. Am Econ Rev 91:79–98.
12. Lamont OA, Thaler RH (2003) Can the market add and subtract? Mispricing in tech
stock carve-outs. J Polit Econ 111:227–268.
13. Plott CR, Sunder S (1982) Efﬁciency of experimental security markets with insider
information: An application of rational-expectations models. J Polit Econ 90:663–698.
14. Forsythe R, Nelson F, Neumann GR, Wright J (1992) Anatomy of an experimental
political stock market. Am Econ Rev 82:1142–1161.
15. Ho T-H, Chen K-Y (2007) New product blockbusters: The magic and science of pre-
diction markets. Calif Manage Rev 50:144–158.
16. Chen K-Y, Plott CR (2002) Information aggregation mechanisms: Concept, design and
implementation for a sales forecasting problem. California Institute of Technology
Social Science Working Paper 1131.
17. Berg JE, Rietz TA (2003) Prediction markets as decision support systems. Inf Syst Front
5:79–93.
18. Wolfers J, Zitzewitz E (2004) Prediction markets. J Econ Perspect 18:107–126.
19. Arrow KJ, et al. (2008) Economics. The promise of prediction markets. Science
320(5878):877–878.
20. Fox CR, Clemen RT (2005) Subjective probability assessment in decision analysis:
Partition dependence and bias toward the ignorance prior.Manage Sci 51:1417–1432.
21. Johnson EJ, Hershey J, Meszaros J, Kunreuther H (1993) Framing, probability dis-
tortions, and insurance decisions. J Risk Uncertain 7:35–51.
22. See KE, Fox CR, Rottenstreich YS (2006) Between ignorance and truth: Partition de-
pendence and learning in judgment under uncertainty. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem
Cogn 32(6):1385–1402.
23. Fox CR, Levav J (2004) Partition-edit-count: Naive extensional reasoning in judgment
of conditional probability. J Exp Psychol Gen 133(4):626–641.
24. Fox CR, Rottenstreich Y (2003) Partition priming in judgment under uncertainty.
Psychol Sci 14(3):195–200.
25. Langer T, Fox CR (2009) Biases in allocation under risk and uncertainty: Partition
dependence, unit dependence, and procedure dependence. University of Muenster,
UCLA Working Paper.
26. Bardolet DF, Fox CR, Lovallo D (2011) Corporate capital allocation: A behavioral
perspective. Strateg Manage J 32:1465–1483.
27. Scharfstein DS, Stein JC (2000) The dark side of internal capital markets: Divisional
rent-seeking and inefﬁcient investment. J Finance 55:2537–2564.
28. Levitt SD, List JA (2008) Economics. Homo economicus evolves. Science 319(5865):909–910.
29. Falk A, Heckman JJ (2009) Lab experiments are a major source of knowledge in the
social sciences. Science 326(5952):535–538.
30. Camerer CF, The promise and success of generalizability in experimental economics: A
critical reply to Levitt and List.Methods in Experimental Economics, eds Frechette and
Schotter, in press.
31. Plott CR, Sunder S (1988) Rational expectations and the aggregation of diverse in-
formation in laboratory security markets. Econometrica 56:1085–1118.
32. Plott CR, Smith VL (2008) Handbook of Experimental Economics Results (North
Holland, Amsterdam), Vol 1.
33. Gürkaynak R, Wolfers J (2006) Macroeconomic Derivatives: An Initial Analysis of
Market-Based Macro Forecasts, Uncertainty, and Risk (National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge, MA).
34. Snowberg E, Wolfers J (2010) Explaining the favorite-long shot bias: Is it risk-love or
misperceptions? J Polit Econ 118:723–746.
35. Axelrod BS, Kulick BJ, Plott CR, Roust KA (2009) The design of improved parimutuel-
type information aggregation mechanisms: Inaccuracies and the long-shot bias as
disequilibrium phenomena. J Econ Behav Organ 69:170–181.
36. Ottaviani M, Sørensen PN (2009) Surprised by the parimutuel odds? Am Econ Rev 99:
2129–2134.
37. Ottaviani M, Sørensen PN (2010) Noise, information, and the favorite-longshot bias in
parimutuel predictions. Am Econ J Microecon 2:58–85.
38. List J (2006) The behavioralist meets the market: Measuring social preferences and
reputation effects in actual transactions. J Polit Econ 114(1):1–37.
39. Camerer CF (1987) Do biases in probability judgment matter in markets? Experi-
mental evidence. Am Econ Rev 77:981–997.
40. Camerer CF, Loewenstein G, Weber M (1989) The curse of knowledge in economic
settings: An experimental analysis. J Polit Econ 97:1232–1254.
41. Ganguly A, Kagel J, Moser D (2000) Do asset market prices reﬂect traders’ judgment
biases? J Risk Uncertain 20:219–245.
42. List J, Al-Ubaydli O, On the generalizability of experimental results in economics.
Methods in Experimental Economics, eds Frechette and Schotter, in press.
43. Mullainathan S, Schwartztein J, Shleifer A (2008) Coarse thinking and persuasion. Q J
Econ 123(2):577–619.
44. Polkovnichenko V, Zhao F (2013) Probability weighting functions implied by options
prices. J Financ Econ 107:580–609.
11784 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1206326110 Sonnemann et al.
